

ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversations with Ms. Diane LaVoy, House Select Committee on Intelligence, on Subject of CIA History and Progress in the Indications and Warning Field

1. Through contact with the Office of Legislative Counsel and the Congressional Support Staff I was visited on 7 February 1978 from 1330 until 1600 by Ms. Diane LaVoy of the House Select Committee on Intelligence. It became clear at the outset that I was but one of a number of Community players in this field whom she was contacting. She had already talked to the NMCC, several parties in DIA, my counterpart at NSA and several IC Staffers at F Street. It was obvious also that I was dealing with an experienced individual. She told me that in addition to concentrating on this area while on the House Staff, she was a member of the Senate Committee staff concentrating on CIA covert action several years ago.

2. After the formalities and general chatter were dispensed with Ms. LaVoy asked me about the history and origins of the CIA Operations Center. This I gave her beginning with the 1973 Working Group Study leading to the present, touching on the various organizational aspects and anomalies. Following this historical discussion and its implications for indications and warning and crisis management, she asked for an historical view on how the Agency was organized in the specific field of indications and warning. As best I could I described the DDI analytical contributions and the history of the Watch Committee and its change to the Strategic Warning Staff. I also related to her my efforts to focus the Agency more specifically and urgently on the problem of crisis management and indications and warning. I related how these efforts had been less than fruitful until George Bush had been persuaded that something should be done and in turn had designated first George Carver and later Cord Meyer to take a serious look as to how CIA should relate to this problem. At this point she asked for documents which could detail this development and I proceeded to show her a series of papers developed by the Cord Meyer Group--of which I was a member--prepared between October 1976 and January 1977. In answer to her question as to the present state of our indications and warning efforts I related that because of the various changes in Agency leadership and in the role of the IC Staff future activity direction was awaiting the emergence of the NITC, or some other element perhaps NFAC, so designated by the DCI or DDCI. In summary I opined that the experiences of the past several years indicate that CIA is now more seized with the issue than previously and intends to pursue it on a broader and more vigorous basis. However, I pointed out that there is still a need for national leadership guidance on this topic so that Intelligence Community efforts can be pursued in harmony with those of operational players in State and with the U.S. military.

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